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John Koenig’s long-running project, The Dictionary of Obscure Sorrows, aims to create new words that capture otherwise
abstract emotions which often escape easy description - words
like ‘vellichor’ (“the strange wistfulness of used bookstores”),
‘silience’ (the “unnoticed excellence that carries on around you
every day, unremarkably”), and ‘kuebiko’ (“a state of exhaustion inspired by acts of senseless violence”). Featured by organizations like TED and NPR, one of Koenig’s most famous
neologisms is ‘sonder,’ the feeling in the moment that “each
random passerby is living a life as vivid and complex as your
own.’ Christine Korsgaard’s new book Fellow Creatures: Our
Obligations to the Other Animals aims to expand this perception of the value of another to include all creatures which have
interests of their own - regardless of the species to which they
happen to belong.
Laid out in three parts, this relatively short book offers a
dense reformulation of one of the more notorious elements of
Kant’s normative position in its 250-odd pages, arguing that
humans do have moral duties to nonhuman animals. Whereas
Kant grounded much of his moral theory on a supposed need
for reciprocity between moral agents, Korsgaard argues that
there is no reason to suppose, on Kantian grounds, that a onesided relational duty is not possible if we have good reasons
for thinking that the object of that duty has moral standing. As
she develops throughout Part One, any creature which has what
she calls a ‘final good’ also has moral standing, regardless of
whether or not that creature can conceptualize or respect either
its own final good or the final good of others.
Derived from her reading of Aristotle, Korsgaard’s sense
of ‘final goods’ is contrastable with the notion of a functional
good: whereas the latter captures evaluative uses of the con-
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cept ‘good’ (as we typically apply it in ordinary discourse), the
former entails that we consider something “worth having, realizing, or bringing about for its own sake” (2.1.3). By defining an
animal as something with a representational system that perceives the world in a ‘valenced’ manner and acts based on that
information (2.1.7), Korsgaard concludes that all animals, by
definition, experience both functional and final goods insofar
as valenced perceptions motivate actions. So, if Kantians are
going to ground morality as the preservation of, or respect for,
final goods (another way to express, she argues, the requirement
to treat people as “ends in themselves”), then there is no reason
to care about what species a given final-goods-holder happens
to be.
To this sense of ‘good,’ Korsgaard adds the important notion
that a good is ‘tethered’ to a particular creature in a particular
context; that is to say, if something is important for a creature,
“it cannot be cut loose from that creature without ceasing to be
important at all” (1.3.2). Put differently, Korsgaard denies that
goodness simply exists on its own; to be good is to be good for
someone or something specific and there is “no real difference
between being absolute and being relative to everyone” (1.3.2).
Ultimately, she concludes that all value is perspectival, for “...
values arise from the point of view of valuing creatures. And
the values that arise from one point of view can be discordant
with values that arise from another….[W]e can see the ethical life as an attempt to bring some unity or harmony into our
various evaluative perspectives, by choosing those ends that are
good for all of us” (4.5.1).
This perspectival understanding of goodness allows Korsgaard to reject several of the perpetual bugbears of conversations about human-animal-relations on the grounds that deter-
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minations of comparative value are often incommensurable:
how could one compare a ‘good-for X’ and a ‘good-for Y’ if the
content of ‘good-for’ in each case is fundamentally different,
given that X and Y are different? Consequently, Korsgaard concludes that a sentence like “humans are more important than
animals” can be neither true nor false, thereby sweeping much
of the debate about ‘speciesism’ off the agenda for discussion
(4.3.6). Similarly, debates about the supposed superiority of particular capacities are meaningless; it’s not that Korsgaard disagrees with Mill’s famous claim that “it is better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied,” but rather that she insists on
asking “better for whom?” with the understanding that a pig’s
perspective on “the Good Life” involves much more straw than
poetry (4.4.3).
In Part Two, Korsgaard specifically critiques Kant’s notion of
duty in light of her perspectival definition of goodness as tethered to particular creatures and their situations. Kant thought,
because they cannot reciprocate the legislation of our moral
laws back upon us, nonhuman animals could not properly possess moral standing within the Kingdom of Ends, so any real
duties that humans have with respect to animals, such as the
duty to not kill a farmer’s cow, are actually indirect duties to
other human beings - the duty is to the farmer, not the cow
(6.2.2). In contrast, Korsgaard argues that the way in which humans derive moral laws for ourselves - in particular, the way
in which we conceive of a being possessing moral standing - if
applied consistently, happens to include nonhumans or, as she
says, “rational beings legislate moral laws whose protections
extend to the other animals” (8.1.1).
This is because of a crucial distinction Korsgaard makes between the ‘active’ and ‘passive’ sense of being an “end in itself.”
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Much like the difference between being a moral agent and a
moral patient, to actively be such an end is to be capable of doing the legislating of moral laws upon others; to be passive is to
be the recipient of such considerations (8.5.1). Korsgaard contends that Kant conflated these two facets of end-legislation, but
when they are distinguished they can easily expand his Kingdom of Ends to incorporate any creature that has a final good. If
any final goods matter to a Kantian, then they all must matter;
in Korsgaard’s words, “the content of the presupposition behind
rational choice is not automatically given by the fact that it is
only rational beings who have to make it” (8.5.1).
A concerning problem, then, in light of her commitment to
perspectival value, concerns the inevitable conflict of valuing
agents whose disparate desires are mutually exclusive, particularly given the absolute intractability of nature to the expectations of rational agents. Because what is good for a lion and
what is good for the lion’s prey are manifestly in opposition, to
recognize the rights of all nonhuman animals with final goods
would seemingly eliminate any chance of actually achieving
the Kingdom of Ends on Earth wherein everyone’s goods are
realized (8.8.3). But to this, Korsgaard responds that a consistent treatment of Kantian principles would not necessarily need
to actually accomplish a comprehensive Kingdom of Ends so
long as all living agents are persistently acting properly; as she
says, “we do not do what is right in order to achieve the good,
but in order to treat others in a way that accords with their value” (8.8.4).
The third and final part of Fellow Creatures stretches the
sentiment of this last quote in a smattering of different directions as Korsgaard suggests applied considerations of her
reformed-Kantian framework for defending animal rights.
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Addressing topics ranging from the eating of meat to animal
experimentation, service creatures in the military, the keeping
of pets, and more, Korsgaard raises more questions than she
answers in this section as she muses in a matter of paragraphs
over topics which each deserve their own extended treatment.
One issue she centers, in 10.3.1, for example, is the tension
between activists who push to eradicate predation in the wild
(effectively requiring all creatures to become domesticated) and
activists who support the organized extinction of bred animals
(effectively requiring all creatures to become feral). By developing what she calls a ‘creation ethic,’ Korsgaard contends that
both sides of this debate fall prey to the same category mistake,
albeit in different directions: we are not responsible for the creation of wild animals, so domesticating and controlling them
would be improper, but we are (in one sense) responsible for the
creation of domesticated creatures, so allowing them all to die
- even by natural causes - would be to neglect that unique duty.
Moreover, because there is a difference, Korsgaard argues,
between “substituting one state of affairs for another, and creating a state of affairs from scratch” (10.4.4) it is impossible
to do anything to a population of living creatures simply ‘for
the sake of’ some hypothetical future set of creatures. Calling
this a problem of ‘gentrification,’ Korsgaard raises the worry
that benefits experienced by the creatures of tomorrow cannot
justify the mistreatment of creatures today - especially when
those two sets of creatures are populated by entirely different
individuals (10.4.5). Such gentrification, though justifiable on
consequentialist grounds, fails to treat the creatures who are
currently alive as respectable ends-in-themselves.
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But perhaps the single largest surprise in this thought-provoking book comes in the final chapter when Korsgaard bluntly
denies Kant’s famous dictum that “ought implies can” (12.1.3).
Because she assigns Kant’s optimism about the potential instantiation of the Kingdom of Ends on Earth to his theology (6.5.2),
Korsgaard believes that, in the absence of that theology, there
is simply no reason to think that “there must be some guarantee that morality and nature are going to fit together somehow”
(12.1.3). Instead, Korsgaard treats the products of deductive
ethical reasoning more like pragmatic tools than divine laws
and draws a distinction between two ways of reading Kant’s
dictum: the connection between blameworthiness and agency (“can’t, therefore not-blameworthy” perhaps) is altogether
different from a positive obligation in itself (“can, therefore
should”). These two distinct variations of “ought implies can”
are not clearly delineated and too quickly passed over in this
text - hopefully, Korsgaard and others will continue to unravel
the thread of this tantalizing dichotomy in future work.
There is much to be commended in Fellow Creatures, both
in what I have summarized, as well as what I have had to neglect; Korsgaard addresses, for example, more complicated notions of desert (6.5), general criticisms of utilitarianism (9), the
improper prioritization of type-Creatures over token individuals (11.6), the morality of human extinction (11.9), and other fascinating topics which each deserve their own monograph. In so
doing, and by presenting her notions of ‘tetheredness’ and the
incorporation of quasi-teleological goodness into a deontological framework, Korsgaard has charted many potential courses
for the next generation of Kantian moral theorists as they continue to explore how “morality is just the human way of being
an animal” (8.6.1).

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 23, Issue 1

